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PROCESS: IMMUNITY OF NONRESIDENT FROM SERVICE
WHILE IN ATTENDANCE AT LITIGATION
State ex rel. lvey v. Circuit Court of Eleventh Judicial Circuit
51 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1951)
Relator Ivey, a nonresident, was named executor of a will in
which he and his wife, also a relator, were named as principal beneficiaries. Shortly after the will was offered for probate William Simpson, appearing as next friend of his adopted children, sought in the
circuit court a declaratory decree against Ivey and others, alleging a
testamentary contract between the testatrix and her deceased husband pursuant to which she was to leave her estate to these children,
the natural offspring of her husband's sister. Meanwhile Simpson and
others had petitioned the county judge's court to set aside the will
on the ground of undue influence by Ivey and his wife on the testatrix. While the Iveys were voluntarily testifying in that proceeding
as witnesses they were served with summons in the circuit court suit,
which they unsuccessfully moved to dismiss as to themselves as individuals on the ground of immunity from service while in attendance
at court. On suggestion for writ of prohibition, HELD, relators were
not immune from service of process. Peremptory writ denied and
rule nisi quashed.
Immunity of a nonresident from service of process while attending
litigation as a party or witness has its derivation in the common law,
reference being made to it as far back as the Year Books of Henry
VI.1 Florida has recognized it by virtue of its adoption of the common law2 and by court decision.3 Courts in general, with but few
exceptions, recognize the doctrine. 4 It was originally confined to
exemption from civil arrest 5 but was subsequently extended to cover
all types of civil process." The concept of immunity is based on the
'See Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. 1, 33, 79 Atl. 790, 794 (Sup. Ct.
1911), citing Y.B. 20 Hen. VI, 10.
2FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1951).
3Rorick v. Chancey, 130 Fla. 442, 178 So. 112 (1937).
4E.g., Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932); Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass. 499,
105 N.E. 363 (1914); Whited v. Phillips, 98 W. Va. 204, 126 S.E. 916 (1925). Contra:
Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1859); Lewis v. Miller, 115 Ky. 623, 74 S.W. 691 (1903);
Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 304, 15, At. 83 (1888).
53 BL. COMM. 0289.

GSee Whited v. Phillips, 98 W. Va. 204, 206, 126 S.E. 916, 917 (1925).
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premise that to allow such service would discourage the voluntary
appearance "of those whose presence is necessary or convenient to
the judicial administration in the pending litigation."7 With the exception of nonresident witnesses, the reason for the rule has for the
most part passed away. Civil arrest no longer exists, s and any actual
interruption of the court by service would be ground for contempt
of court proceedings. The rule nevertheless remains in our jurisprudence for the rather vague reasons that it promotes "due administration of justice" and accords with "public policy."o
As stated in the instant case, the immunity is not absolute. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine is founded
"not upon the convenience of the individuals, but of the court itself."11 The privilege should not be enlarged beyond the reason upon
which it is founded, but should be ".

require." 2

.

. extended or withheld only

Thus the rule of the instant case
as judicial necessities
the
subject
matter of the first suit is correlated
has evolved that when
to or incidental to the subject matter of the second suit immunity
will be denied. 3
Application of the general doctrine of immunity to a specific case
requires an especially close examination of the particular facts involved. In the instant situation both proceedings concerned the same
will. Had one of the suits involved merely a claim against the estate
the service might well have been quashed; but here the same parties
7Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932).
SMertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 185, 66 S.W.2d 127, 131 (1933).
9Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932).
IoSee Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 712, 16 P.2d 741, 743 (1932), cert. denied,
289 U.S. 740 (1933), in which, however, the duty of a father to support his destitute minor child was considered an even higher "public policy."
"Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932).
"1Ibid. The wording of the opinion is similar to that in Brooks v. State ex rel.
Richards, 26 Del. 1, 34, 79 At. 790, 794 (Sup. Ct. 1911), in which the court, in
refusing to immunize from service the president of a corporation voluntarily attending, but not appearing in, a trial involving his corporation, stated: "The
privilege [of immunity] arises out of the authority and dignity of the court, it is
founded on the necessities of judicial administration, it has for its primal object
the protection of the court and not the immunity of the person, and is extended
or withheld only as judicial necessities require." Contra: Guynn v. McDaneld, 4
Idaho 605, 43 Pac. 74 (1895).
13E.g., Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921); Arnett v. Carol C. &
Fred R. Smith, Inc., 165 Miss. 53, 145 So. 638 (1933); Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb.
890. 46 NW.2d 618 (1951); Shelito v. Grimshaw, 367 Pa. 599, 81 A.2d 544 (1951).
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were endeavoring, albeit in two proceedings, to determine within the
same jurisdiction those persons legally entitled to the estate, and the
court was not yet considering final disposition and adjudication of
all claims to the res. Similarly, in suits for custody of children which
follow divorce actions, it is important to determine what part custody
of the children is playing. One court in granting immunity has held
that the custody of children, while ordinarily awarded to the successful party in the divorce, is incidental to the matter of severing the
bonds of matrimony, 14 although authority to the contrary exists.15
Other cases regard an action for malicious prosecution as of the same
subject matter if the basis for the action is the original criminal
prosecution.-5 A Wyoming case 11 throws some doubt on this view
but is not irreconcilable. A father and son had been arrested for
embezzlement; the father was convicted, but the son was released
before trial for want of evidence. While the complaining witness was
in voluntary attendance at the father's trial the son served him with
summons in an action for wrongful arrest. In quashing the summons
the court took the position that the father's trial was based on his
own wrongful deeds, as distinct from any acts of his son, while the
son was seeking to indemnify himself for a separate wrong allegedly
committed against him by the complaining witness.
Those jurisdictions that hold to the exception apparently deny
immunity if the two causes originate in the same transaction or aim
at a common result. The basis for the exception is clear: a nonresident cannot come into court within a given jurisdiction and yet
clothe himself with an immunity that places the local resident at a
disadvantage and in effect forces him to go outside the jurisdiction to
litigate fully a matter currently being considered within the jurisdiction of his residence. When the nonresident party decides to enter
a jurisdiction he is presumed to realize that all claims connected with
the cause prompting him to enter will be settled while he is there;
and if he is then served with process in a closely connected second
suit he receives no more than he bargained for when he entered.' 8
v. Jett, 155 Tenn. 473, 295 S.W. 65 (1927).
15Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921); Tiedemann
35 Nev. 259, 129 Pac. 313 (1913).
36Von Kesler v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 89, 292 Pac. 544
v. Sanborn, 79 Md. 364, 29 Atl. 522 (1894).
"7State ex rel. Brainard v. District Court, 34 Wyo. 288, 243 Pac.
'SThe malicious prosecution cases, supra note 16, may perhaps
14Jett
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v. Tiedemann,
(1930); Mullen
123 (1926).
go beyond this
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